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TheWeathering of the Trace
Agamben’s Presupposition of Derrida
DAMIANO SACCO
The urgency of the question of the status of the trace can perhaps in
no way be justified, it can only be asserted. The trace ‘itself ’, Derrida
argues, cannot be done justice to—the trace, another name for justice,
cannot be justified.Theurgency of the question of the trace is unfolded
in this essay alongside a principal axis instituted by the following
question: is it possible that the trace might be weathering away? Is it
altogether possible for the trace to weather away like a material trace
would, a trace imprinted in the mud or in the snow, a trace exposed
to the elements? It is not immediately clear how one should think
the weathering of the trace — to which elements would the trace be
exposed? ToHeidegger’s earth? To his forgetting of air? ToNietzsche’s
fear of water? To everyone’s obsession with fire? Or is it the case,
instead, that the trace has in fact already withered away — that there
are no more traces to be found? Notwithstanding, one should at least
justify the possibility of addressing the question of the trace under the
heading of weathering, at least justify the possibility of articulating the
question alongside a guideline that does not immediately appear to
move in the vicinities of the trace.Theprincipal standpoint fromwhich
this reflection moves is then the one which enables the thinking of the
movement of the trace together with a certain notion of weathering.
When a building, a stone, or amonument are exposed to the elements,
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it can be argued that a certain logic of ‘supplementarity’ is at work, a
familiar kind of addition by subtraction or subtraction by addition: the
monument gains somethingbybeingweathered—it gains a new status
by something perhaps being removed or weathered off its surface, it
gains something through a subtraction — and, at the same time, the
monument loses something, its original status, through the additional
supplement or sedimentation of the elements — it loses something
through an addition. There is then an extent to which weathering,
according to this logic of supplementarity, as the deferral of an origin
that has always already beenweathered, as an exposure to the elements,
as an exposure to the Other, as an exposure that precedes all fantasies
of self-presence, as the opening of temporality itself, but also, as will
be made clear in the other contributions to this volume, as the logic of
the archive — the logic of what remains alive of the dead and what is
already dead of the living — as the haunting of memory, as the work
of mourning, as the creation and erasure of physical traces — there
is an extent to which the movement of the trace and this notion of
weathering can be thought together.
The question at stake in this essay, however, is not that of weather-
ing, but rather that of the weathering of the trace (objective genitive).1
This question turns out to be problematic if approached from the
current standpoint, for the weathering of the trace would stand for a
weathering of weathering itself, for the trace of the trace ‘itself ’. This
is a well-known problem, or feature, of deconstruction: namely, the
aporia that arises when one attempts to think the possibility of a trans-
formation or weathering of the very opening of temporality, of spacing,
of the very exposure that first makes any weathering possible. To posit
that the trace is liable to any notion of transformation, modification,
or weathering would be to resort, precisely, to a possibility for change
for which the trace will have always been the very opening. This is
a feature that is known, in Aristotle (but not in Plato), as anhypo-
theticity (or, before Meillassoux’s intervention, more commonly as
1 The expression ‘weathering of the trace’ has two meanings: when the genitive is
taken as subjective, it attributes the performance of weathering to the trace, signalling
that the trace is the source or principle of weathering; when the genitive is taken as
objective, it is the trace to be subjected or exposed to weathering. This latter case will
be explored as the subject matter of the essay.
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elenchus): that is, the impossibility to attempt to refute (elenchein)
a certain principle, of non-contradiction in Aristotle’s case, without
having of necessity to resort to it.Thequestion of theweathering of the
trace is then equivalent to that of anhypotheticity, a question of self-
referentiality with which continental thought seems to keep confront-
ing itself — by asking whether being is, whether the trace is, whether
die Sprache spricht, whether contingency is contingent, whether plasti-
city is plastic, whetherweatheringweathers, and so forth. According to
different topologies, the boundary of language— its limit — is either
simple or, rather, consists of a certain fold that turns in upon itself.
Deconstruction takes the following stance: there can be no trace of
the trace, no deconstruction of deconstruction, no autoimmunity of
autoimmunity, no hymen of the hymen, no glas of glas, no weather-
ing of weathering. Justice, another name for deconstruction, Derrida
states, is undeconstructible; the trace, as autoimmunity, is not liable
to any autoimmunitary reaction, be that a permanent autoimmunitary
disease or a seasonal allergy.2 The aim of this essay is to confront the
question of the anhypotheticity of the trace — the question of the
weathering of the trace — with the claim that the trace itself would
be inscribed in a certain history, not quite a temporal one, through an
inscription that it has not itself written— the trace would be inscribed
in a history that has come to an end.This is Agamben’s claim.
I
For over forty years, from his first Stanzas through to What Is Philo-
sophy?, Agamben has time and again engaged with the standpoint of
deconstruction: an engagement that has at times been overt, at times
covert, at times self-effacing, and at times, of necessity, unaware of
itself. In the impossibility to render justice to this pluri-decennial con-
frontation, the hope is that this inevitably partial re-enactment might
shed light on the question of rendering justice itself — to a text, to a
reading, to justice itself. If the principle of reason is one of reddendae
2 For a different approach to the question of anhypotheticity, which points to the
undecidability of the status of contingency, deconstruction, etc., see Damiano Sacco,
‘Of Apousia and Parousia: The Correlation between Heidegger and Meillassoux’, Pli,
30 (2019), pp. 141–63.
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rationis, the anhypotheticity of justice deals precisely with the im-
possibility of rendering justice to justice itself. The plan is to present
Agamben’s claim on the status of the trace and to then outline his own
proposal.
The principal claimmade by Agamben is that, since Aristotle, our
experience of language has been shaped by one particular modus op-
erandi, to wit, the presuppositional one. Agamben argues that with Ar-
istotle we observe the inception of a structuring guideline throughout
which language will operate as a determinate apparatus (dispositivo):
namely, one that is responsible for the ‘the scission of being into a
hypokeimenon, something lying-at-the-base (the being named or in-
dicated of a singular existent, insofar as it is not said of a subject but
is a presupposition for every discourse) and that which is said on the
presupposition of it’.3 To predicate in language always means having
pre-supposed, a posteriori, the existence of a substratum or hypostasis
that precedes all predicates. Agamben writes:
As soon as there is language, the named thing is presupposed
as the nonlinguistic or the unrelated with which language
has established its relation. This presupposing power is so
strong that we imagine the non-linguistic as something unsay-
able and unrelated, which we somehow try to grasp as such,
without realizing that in this waywe are simply trying to grasp
the shadow of language. In this sense, the unsayable is a genu-
inely linguistic category, which can be conceived only by a
speaking being.4
The trajectory of the history of Western metaphysics, a trajectory that
Heidegger and Derrida read as being indexed by certain order of pres-
ence, a metaphysics of presence — this trajectory is re-interpreted by
Agamben as that of the history of a certain experience of language,
precisely a language that is inherently presuppositional, that cannot
help but pre-suppose, after taking place, a prior, non-linguistic sub-
stratum that it itself constitutes retroactively. The self-presence of the
signified, namely the target ofHeideggeriandestruction andDerridean
3 Giorgio Agamben,The Use of Bodies, trans. by Adam Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2016), pp. 131–32.
4 Giorgio Agamben, What Is Philosophy?, trans. by Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2018), p. 35.
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deconstruction, should be traced, according to Agamben, to the self-
presence of the retroactive positing of the linguistic presupposition,
the self-presence of the non-linguistic presupposition. The history of
metaphysics coincides then with the history of the presuppositional
experience of language: ‘It is in the structure of presupposition that
the interweaving of being and language, ontology and logic that consti-
tutesWesternmetaphysics is articulated.’5Thehistory of metaphysics,
rather than being constituted by a number of inscrutable sendings
destined by a giving thatwill forever elude being given itself—a giving
nevertheless constrained by the double binds of unconcealment and
concealment (Un-verborgenheit), disclosure and withdrawal (Enthül-
lung, Entzug), appropriation and expropriation (Ereignis, Enteignis)—
this history is rather to find its material inscription in the development
of a science of language as well as in the uncovering of the presup-
posing structure that underlies the Western experience of language.
An uncovering that follows the material conditions of ‘centuries of
humble analysis and grammatical education, through which language
[lingua, (langue)] has been extracted from speech [parola, (parole)]
and interiorized as knowledge’.6
This reading enables Agamben to ground the trajectory of the his-
tory of metaphysics— a trajectory that according toHeidegger moves
along an axis indexed by the objectification (Vergegenständlichung,Ob-
jektivierung) and constant presence (beständige Anwesenheit) of the
existent — on the development of a science of language that progres-
sively uncovers the logic of presupposition, of the self-presence of the
presupposed, of the institution of a subject of language, and so forth.
Moreover, both the inception and the conclusion of the history of
metaphysics find their own rationales: Aristotle’s inception marks the
beginning of the presuppositional experience of language, and, at the
5 Agamben,The Use of Bodies, p. 119.
6 Giorgio Agamben, ‘La parola e il sapere’, aut aut, 179–80 (September–December
1980), pp. 155–66 (p. 157; my translation): ‘It is sufficient to reflect, even for just a
moment, to realize that, while speech [parola], the concrete instance of discourse, is
something that can be experienced immediately and concretely, language [lingua] is
nothing but a construction of science that originates in speech. In order for something
like language to even just be conceived of, in order for it to become something firmer
and more real than speech, centuries, even millennia, of grammatical and logical
reflection on language have been necessary.’
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other end, the development of the modern science of linguistics that
takes place from Bopp through to Saussure and Benveniste marks the
accomplishment of this experience. Agamben writes:
This is theCopernican revolution that the thought of our time
inherits fromnihilism:we are the first humanbeingswhohave
become completely conscious of language. For the first time,
what preceding generations called God, Being, spirit, uncon-
scious appear to us as what they are: names for language.7
And he continues:
The primordial character of the word is now completely re-
vealed, and no new figure of the divine, no new historical
destiny can lift itself out of language. […] If God was the
name of language, ‘God is dead’ can only mean that there is
no longer a name for language.8
Crucially, this reading provides Agamben with a foothold that enables
him to extend the history of metaphysics just enough to also include
Derrida and the trace. Derrida’s thought comes to represent, in Agam-
ben’s reading, the end of the trajectory beginning with Aristotle: the
end of the presupposing experience of language. Agamben’s gesture
consists in claiming that the trace, in not being able to escape the
presuppositional experience of language, rather brings it to its con-
clusion: the trace is, Agamben argues, presupposition of nothing but
of itself — the trace is inscribed in the history of metaphysics as self-
presupposition.The self-presence of the presupposed is forever deferred
by the trace precisely because the action of presupposition comes to be
shifted, at each turn, to act upon itself: the trace does not presuppose a
self-present signified, but rather keeps presupposing a presupposition
to each presupposition.The immediacy of the internal voice has always
already presupposed the mediation of an external writing, which in
turn can exist as amediationor an externality only if it has presupposed
… and so forth, with the movement of arche-writing or trace standing
7 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language’, in Agamben, Potentialities, ed. and trans. by
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 39–47 (p.
45).
8 Ibid.
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precisely for the differing and deferral operated by the process of self-
presupposition. Agamben writes:
For there to be the signification of an intentionality and not
of an object, it is necessary that the term signify itself, but
signify itself only insofar as it signifies. It is thus necessary that
the intentio neither be a referent nor, for that matter, simply
refer to an object. In the semiotic scheme by which aliquid
stat pro aliquo, A stands for B, the intentio cannot indicate the
first aliquid or the second; it must, rather, above all refer to
the ‘standing for’ itself. The aporia of Derrida’s terminology
is that in it, one standing for stands for another standing for,
without anything like an objective referent constituting itself
in its presence. But, accordingly, the very notion of sense (of
‘standing for’) then enters into a state of crisis. This is the
particular rigour of Derrida’s terminology.9
The trace, as self-presupposition, is then inscribed in the history of the
presuppositional experience of language as its necessary completion.
According to a recurrent strategy, Agamben performs a gesture that
enables him to include a certain element in a system through its very
exclusion, namely to include the graphic element of the trace as the
negative, i.e. the inverse/reverse, of the history of onto-theology.10
Through a logic of the exception, a logic of ex-capio, the trace is in-
cluded in the history of metaphysics precisely by its conformity, albeit
bymeans of its negation, to the presuppositional structure of language,
i.e. by excluding or disenabling the retroactive presupposition of a ref-
erent.The weathering of the trace (subjective genitive)— the trace as
weathering— stands according to Agamben as the completion of the
history of metaphysics.11
9 Ibid., p. 212, translation modified.
10 See, e.g., Agamben, What Is Philosophy?, pp. 19–20 or Giorgio Agamben, Language
and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. by Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 38–40.
11 Agamben repeatedly grounds his assessment of the trace on Aristotle’s De Interpreta-
tione and on its ancient commentators. Agamben argues that the articulation between
phōnē and logos, between bare voice and signifying language, can take place only thanks
to the function of the letter, gramma, both element and sign of the voice: ‘Insofar as it
is the element of that of which it is a sign, it has the privileged status of being an index
sui, self-demonstration; like protē ousia, of which it constitutes the linguistic cipher, it
shows itself, but only insofar as it was in the voice, that is, insofar as it always already
belongs to the past. The gramma is thus the form of presupposition itself and nothing
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II
Before attempting to render justice to this reading, before asking
whether the trace can effectively be included through an exclusion or
whether it has the potential of deactivating the logic of the exception, it
will be necessary to provide a brief outline ofAgamben’s ownproposal.
Having delimited the domain of metaphysics by means of a certain
experience of language that runs from Aristotle to Derrida, Agamben
resorts to the Heideggerian need for a step-back-beyond in order to
move beyond the presuppositional history of language.This step back,
which according to Heidegger should prepare the springing board or
the run-up space for the leap (Satz) beyondmetaphysics, is then quite
literally a step back from Aristotle, namely a certain return to Plato’s
theory of ideas and quest for a principle freed from all presupposi-
tions, an archē anypothetos. It is then exactly in the space articulated
by the two different notions of anhypotheticity that a confrontation
between Derrida and Agamben is to be staged. On the one hand, an-
hypotheticity as the impossibility to contest a principlewithout having
necessarily to resort to it (to argue that the trace would presuppose a
more original opening would precisely mean to resort to a notion of
presupposition that is a prerogative of the trace); on the other hand,
anhypotheticity as the attempt to do away with the logic of presuppos-
ition altogether, namely to turn to an experience of language that knows
nothing of presuppositions, be they simple or self-referential.
The entry point to this different notion of anhypotheticity is then
the following: if the unsayable, the non-linguistic, is nothing but the
else’ (Agamben, ‘The Thing Itself ’, in Agamben, Potentialities, pp. 27–38 (p. 37); see
also Agamben, ‘Tradition of the Immemorial’, in Agamben, Potentialities, pp. 104–15
(pp. 111, 113)). Signifying language, Agamben argues, is always articulated (enarth-
ros) and phōnē enarthros means phōnē engrammatos, vox quae scribi potest (Agamben,
‘Philosophy and Linguistics’, in Agamben, Potentialities, pp. 62–76 (p. 75)): ‘The let-
ter, as the interpreter of the voice, does not itself need any other interpreter. It is the
final interpreter, beyond which no hermēneia is possible: the limit of all interpretation’
(ibid., p. 37). He can therefore conclude: ‘What has reached completion is in fact not
the natural history of humanity, but that most special epochal history in which the
hermēneia of speech as a language [lingua]— that is, as an intentional intertwining of
terms, concepts, things, and letters that takes place in the voice through the grammata
— had destined the West’ (What is Philosophy?, p. 23). In the following it will be
shown that the trace, neither gramma nor phōnē, neither positing nor presupposing,
can neither be said to be within nor to be without the history of metaphysics.
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presupposition of language, the shadow that language necessarily casts
in its taking place, it is on the contrary the sayable (il dicibile), the
sayability of the sayable, that with which philosophy should concern
itself:
It is not the unsayable but the sayable that constitutes the
problem philosophy must at each turn confront again. The
unsayable is in fact nothing else than a presupposition of lan-
guage. […] The unsayable is a genuinely linguistic category,
which can be conceived only by a speaking being. […]On the
other hand, the sayable is a non-linguistic but genuinely onto-
logical category.The elimination of the unsayable in language
coincides with the exhibition of the sayable as a philosophical
task.12
Precisely the task of exhibiting, or even exposing, the pure sayability
of the sayable can, according to Agamben, be attended to by turning to
Plato’s theory of ideas. Neither does the idea, the ‘thing itself ’, have a
proper name nor is it homonymous with the thing: ‘the “circle itself ”
(autos ho kyklos) seizes the circle not at the level of signification but
in its pure having a name, in that pure sayability that alone makes
discourse and knowledge possible.’13 The specific performance of the
pronounautos is that of signalling anotionof sameness that, in contrast
to the notion of mere identity (ipse and das Selbe rather than idem or
das Gleiche), articulates the matter of thinking since the Heideggerian
intervention.A certain notionof sameness of being and thought comes
then to be articulated anew in Plato’s theory of ideas: the idea belongs
neither to thought nor to being, neither to langue nor to parole, it
does not substantialize or abstract an ideal world, but rather, as event
of language, deactivates and neutralizes these oppositions by joining
together the thing with its being named:
In this way, Plato problematizes the pure and irreducible
givenness of language. At this point — where the name is
resumed from and in its naming the thing, and the thing is
resumed from and in its being named by the name — the
12 Agamben,What Is philosophy?, p. 35.
13 Ibid., p. 58.
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world and language are in contact, that is, they are united only
by an absence of representation.14
Thepromise of a different experience of language is to bewaged on the
contemplation of the event of language, on a suspension ofwhat (quid)
is being said to attend to the fact that (quod) it is being said. According
to Agamben, in this shift, ‘the whole modern theory of signification is
called into question.’15 This is the step back from the presuppositional
experience of language that prepares for the leap beyondmetaphysics:
Language, which for human beings mediates all things and
all knowledge, is itself immediate. Nothing immediate can
be reached by speaking beings — nothing, that is, except
language itself, mediation itself. For human beings, such an
immediate mediation constitutes the sole possibility of reach-
ing a principle freed of every presupposition, including self-
presupposition. Such an immediate mediation alone, in other
words, allows human beings to reach that arkhē anypotethos,
that ‘unpresupposed principle’ that Plato, in the Republic,
presents as the telos, fulfilment and end of autos ho logos, lan-
guage itself […].There can be no true human community on
the basis of a presupposition — be it a nation, a language, or
even the a priori of communication of which hermeneutics
speaks. What unites human beings among themselves is not
a nature, a voice, or a common imprisonment in signifying
language; it is the vision of language itself and, therefore, the
experience of language’s limits, its end. A true community can
only be a community that is not presupposed.16
If the weathering of the trace, the trace as weathering, constitutes the
consummation of the history of metaphysics, it is then a notion of the
weather, a notion of the event of language freed of all presuppositions,
that which sets forth the promise of a different experience of language.
III
The principle of justice— the anhypotheticity of justice— precludes
the rendering of justice to the trace, the rendering of justice to justice.
14 Ibid., p. 65.
15 Ibid., p. 60.
16 Agamben, ‘The Idea of Language’, p. 47.
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There is nevertheless a minimal gap that separates the movement of
the trace from what Agamben refers to — a minimal gap that affords
a rendering of justice. Every positing (Setzung), in taking place, points
to a prior positing as to a presupposition (Voraussetzung) of its very
taking place: namely, in the very act of positing, it—the positing itself
— is presupposed to its own performance. The logic of positing and
presupposing, the logic of reflection, finds perhaps its most natural
fulfilment in being posited itself as one moment of the unfolding of an
ideal Substance/Subject, towit,Hegel’s Spirit. Spirit, in positing its ob-
ject, finds itself as the very presuppositionof this positing; that is to say,
Spirit finds itself— its own interiority— in the exteriority of theobject
it has itself posited. Positing, by being posited itself, presupposes itself;
presupposition, in being itself posited becomes self-presupposition.
Given this logic of self-presupposition— namely, given the dialectics
between Setzung and Voraussetzung that locates in each positing a pre-
supposition which comes itself to be posited — then, the movement
or inscription of the trace can be said to be neither equal nor different,
neither internal nor external, to this economy of self-presupposition.
Between the restricted economy of self-presupposition and the gen-
eralized one of the trace, there is not a fully constituted difference,
but precisely the trace of a difference, the difference of a trace.17 The
stakes and the promise of the whole Derridean project lie precisely
in exhibiting and demonstrating, by means of an ex-hibiting that is a
de-monstration, that the very condition of possibility of the restricted
economy of Setzung and Voraussetzung, of positing and presupposing,
is a moment that of necessity exceeds this economy. The economy of
reflection is set into play neither by a positing nor by a presupposing,
but rather by the excess of an ex-positing or of an ex-posure: the excess
of an Aussetzung. The exposure that first makes possible this economy
and that, at the same time, exceeds the aegis of its logic— the abstract
negativity that cannot be drained by any determinate one, the gift that
precedes all notions of accountability, the unconditional hospitality
17 One should confront here with the claim found in Derrida’s 1964–65 seminar that
the ‘difference’ betweenHegel andHeidegger, between Erinnerung andDestruktion, ‘is
thus as close as possible to nothing’. Jacques Derrida, Heidegger: The Question of Being
and History, trans. by Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2016), p. 9.
154 WEATHERING OF THE TRACE
for the unposited Other, and so forth — this excess is found again, at
each step, within the economy itself in a certain distancing of positing
from itself: a distancing that does not quite amount to a full difference
precisely because it does not distance two positings, but a positing and
the other positing that will have been presupposed only by virtue of
this very distancing. The trace is therefore not simply presupposition
of itself, the trace does not institute a restricted economy of Setzung-
Voraussetzung, but rather renders the latter destitute — i.e. it renders
it justice — through the inscription of the generalized economy of
Setzung-Aussetzung-Voraussetzung. Accordingly, every positing takes
place bymeans of an exposure that is neither posited nor presupposed,
every presupposing takes place by virtue of a non-posited exposure of
positing, every exposure inscribes an economy of positing and presup-
posing.
BeyondDerrida— one could quote here a whole series of texts in
toto— it is perhaps Hamacher the one to have most insisted in letting
this structure emerge across the tradition. In Kant, where the very
fact that the order of the posited is taken as the order of being (‘The
concept of position or positing (Position oder Setzung) is completely
simple and is the same as the concept of Being’18) entails that positing
itself cannot quite be said ‘to be’: ‘it means that positing, affected by
something other than Being understood as position, never is—never
“is” according to its own sense of “is,” according to the sense of thetic
Being.’19 In Fichte:
Fichte’s proposition can be characterized in this way: in order
for the proposition to be able to realize its constative character
through which the identity of the I with itself is designated
as Being, it needs an absolutely nonrelational, performative
positing, a sheer act that can be neither the action of an I nor
an action in relation to an I, hence no action of consciousness
and no intentional correlate of consciousness.20
18 WernerHamacher, ‘Premises’, in Hamacher, Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Litera-
ture from Kant to Celan, trans. by Peter Fenves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1996), pp. 1–43 (p. 11; quoting from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason).
19 Ibid., p. 14.
20 WernerHamacher, ‘Position Exposed: Friedrich Schlegel’s Poetological Transposition
of Fichte’s Absolute Proposition’, in Hamacher, Premises, pp. 222–60 (p. 234).
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In Hegel:
Hegel does not dissolve the aporia of understanding. On the
contrary, for him, the aporia constitutes the resistance from
which experience must rebound and turn back on itself. By
supposing that the incomprehensible has a meaning, spirit
understands it as its object and understands itself as its posit-
ing. […] [Spirit] takes the only path that the blockage of the
aporia leaves open: a path back to itself.21
And, of course, in Heidegger:
In the essay ‘On the Essence of Truth,’ he [Heidegger] does
not use the terminology of understanding and anticipation
but that of letting, leaving, and ex-posing: ‘As this letting-be,
it exposes itself to beings as such and transposes all comport-
ment into the open. Letting-be, that is, freedom, is in itself
ex-posing [aus-setzend], ek-sistent. Seen from the perspective
of the essence of truth, the essence of freedom shows itself as
exposure [Aussetzung] to the unconcealment of beings.’ […]
As the ex-posure of positing—theAussetzung der Setzung, the
interruption of every positional act, the exposition of every
possible position — it draws on an opening, an unposited
space, and a place impossible to posit.22
It is from this standpoint that weathering, or the trace, appears not
simply as an infinite regression of an always-already weathered ex-
istent, but rather as the emergence of this economy by means of an
exposure to its unweatherable condition of possibility — an exposure
to the event of the weather. The weather, the factum of language, con-
stitutes the archē anypothetos, the giving of the economy of weathering
— an economy that will always contain the inscription of a trace that
cannot be weathered by anhypotheticity. In order to distance himself
fromDerrida, Agambenmisses the opportunity to see that this distan-
cing arises only by his mis-positing of the trace — a mis-positing that
reveals the two projects to be perhaps as close as they could be. For,
on the one hand, the event of language as archē anypothetos gives rise
21 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, pp. 7–9.
22 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 38; quoting from Heidegger’s ‘On the Essence of Truth’.
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to an economy of positing and presupposing in which one can always
find the inscription of a trace, a trace that cannot be weathered by
anhypotheticity. Conversely, by virtue of its own anhypotheticity, the
trace precludes positing from positing itself by inscribing a distancing
within positing itself: the event of positing, the weather, constitutes an
archē anypothetos. To think the weathering or the anhypotheticity of
the trace amounts then to thinking the event of language, the event
of the weather, as archē anypothetos. Weather and weathering, event
of language and trace, abandoned being and exposed positing, archē
anypothetos and anhypotheticity of the lack of archē—but also, bando
and bande, potenza and puissance/potence, soglia and hymen, and so
forth — Agamben and Derrida’s projects are tangent to each other
without any possibility of being disjoined. One should mark each of
the followingwords byHamacher: ‘Positing is exposed positing; aban-
donedby itself, it is thus ex-position.’23Thisessay is perhapsonly a long
exegesis of this one sentence, of the relation between the exposure of
positing and the exceptional bando of abandoned being.24 Hamacher
articulates this relation as follows:
It thus becomes clear that there can be a position— and thus
Being, subject, language, and understanding — only from
the ex-position of this position: only, therefore, from what
is precisely not an understanding of Being as position, not a
subject, not a language, and not an understanding — and is,
moreover, not a negation of any of these but the opening of
every one. Only as an ex-posed, abandoned subject is there
23 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 15. One should confront once again with the ‘difference’
between Hegel and Heidegger as found in Derrida’s 1964–65 seminar, see previous
note.
24 See also Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, inThe Birth to Presence, trans. by Brian
Holmes (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 36–47. Equivalent read-
ings could have been performed by substituting exposure (Aussetzung) with either the
de-posing (Ent-setzung) of positing (Setzung) or with its trans-posing (Über-setzung).
Hamacher writes: ‘Translation [Übersetzung] is the exposition of languages in lan-
guage […]. In it, language exposes positing itself and being as the position of another
being — or of another as being — which for its part presents itself not positively,
[…] but rather only as the movement of this ex-posure [Aus-setzung] and de-posing
[Ent-setzung] of positing [Setzung].’ Werner Hamacher, ‘Intensive Languages’, trans.
by Ira Allen and Steven Tester, MLN, 127.3 (April 2012), pp. 485–541 (p. 536). In
this regard, see also Heidegger’s discussion of the Grundstimmung of Entsetzung, Ben-
jamin’s work on translation, on the Entsetzung of the law, Paul’s katargēsis, Agamben’s
destituent potential, and so forth.
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a subject in the first place, and only as ex-posed, disrupted
language and understanding is there anything like language or
understanding at all.25
The guiding question of this essay, the question of the weathering of
the trace, is then inseparable from that of the event of the weather, of
the factum of language.The two questions point, albeit in opposite dir-
ections, to one and the samematter, to the constitutive impossibility to
think within language either an archē anypothetos or the anhypotheti-
city of a lack of archē. This rift within language, this internal fissure,
is not to be taken as an infinitely distant boundary that establishes a
limit with the real, but as the remnant of an encounter, the mark of the
loss that language has had to sustain in order to constitute itself, the
sacrifice through which language has had to make itself sacer, through
which language has had to abandon itself. The impossibility to think
the weathering of the trace and the failure to think the event of lan-
guage are— finally without any metaphoricity — the real, the Other
exposed to the Other, language exposed to itself:
The auto-parekbasis of language as such. It is the movement
that leaps out of the uncontainable excess of speaking over
the spoken, of positing over every positivity, of the act of
positing over its fixation in the position of subjectivity. […]
Language speaks as absolute ex-position: as ekbasis, as excess,
interruption, and opening up.26
There can be no trace ‘itself ’ and there can be no autos ‘itself ’.
IV
Theurgency of the question at stake is seen to both propel the analysis
forward and to put a halt to it — precisely for a lack of time. Had the
question not been so urgent, one could have articulated the same logic,
one could have attempted to apply the same change of coordinates
25 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 16.
26 Hamacher, ‘Position Exposed’, p. 254. Parekbasis marks the speech that the chorus
would give to the people in the middle of the play by stepping out (ekbasis) of the
piece and of the limits of the proscenium, ‘a complete interruption and Aufhebung of
the play’. See ibid., p. 248.
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between the trace and the event of language, along other axes: fol-
lowing the guideline of language, concerning the performativity of the
performative and the sacrament of language; following the guideline
of the law, through the two readings of ‘Before the Law’; following
the guideline of the name, concerning the inscription of the trace in
every proper name and the lack of a name for the name; following the
question of matter, the question of the khōra; following the guideline
of the promise, the question ofmessianism, both betweenDerrida and
Agamben and between Derrida and Benjamin; following many other
guidelines.27 But had the questions not been so urgent, one would
have had no reason to follow these guidelines to begin with. My own
promise then, urgently.
We have already heard Agamben claiming that the experience of
language that has structured our tradition, an experience that when
made non-thetically thematic constitutes the sought after archē anypo-
thetos—this experience of language is that of an immediatemediation.
Said otherwise, language as the medium that gives access must itself
be immediate, it can posit something only insofar as it is itself not
posited. Were that not the case, rather than letting the existent come
forth, it would hinder this process by its own obtrusiveness, it would
itself appear and conceal the existent. With the assistance of a number
of eminent predecessors, let us designate this conception of language
by the epithet ‘weak’, or, equivalently, by the epithet ‘little’ — not
comparatively, as opposed to a strong one, but absolutely so:
27 For what concerns the question of the performative see, e.g., Jacques Derrida, Specters
of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans.
by Peggy Kamuf (London: Routledge, 1994) and Giorgio Agamben,The Sacrament of
Language: AnArchaeology of the Oath, trans. by AdamKotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2011). For the reading of Kafka see Jacques Derrida, ‘Before the
Law’, trans. by Avital Ronell and Christine Roulston, in his Acts of Literature, ed.
by Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 181–220, and Giorgio Agamben,
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1998). For the question of the name and of the khōra,
see Jacques Derrida, On the Name, trans. by David Wood, John P. Leavey, Jr., and
Ian McLeod (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995) and Giorgio Agamben,
‘Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality’, in Potentialities, pp. 205–19. For an attempt at
the question of the promise, see Damiano Sacco, ‘Highest Openness: On Agamben’s
Promise’, in Openness and Medieval Culture, ed. by Manuele Gragnolati and Almut
Suerbaum (Berlin: ICI Berlin Press, forthcoming), and references therein.
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This movement of language from the withdrawal, this non-
positional and presuppositionless language of freedom, is,
according to one possible reading of Schlegel’s note, ‘little’. It
does not show an object that would be little but shows ‘how
little’ its showing is and thus shows that there is language.28
And again:
The ‘weakness’ of logos [to tōn logōn asthenes, Plato’s Seventh
Letter 343a1] therefore consists precisely in the fact that it is
not capable of bringing this very knowability and sameness to
expression; it must transform the knowability of beings that is
at issue in it in a presupposition.29
And again:
To this presupposing structure of language corresponds the
specificity of its way of being, which amounts to the fact that it
must remove itself in order to make the named thing be.This
is the nature of language Duns Scotus has in mind when he
defines the relation as ens debilissimum and adds that it is for
this reason so difficult to know. Language is ontologically very
weak, in the sense that it cannot but disappear in the thing
it names, otherwise, rather than designating or unveiling the
thing, it would hinder its comprehension.30
And again:
AsMeister Eckhartwrites, if the form throughwhichwe know
a thingwere itself something, it would leadus to its knowledge
and turn away from the knowledge of the thing. The risk of
being itself perceived as a thing, and of separating us from
what it should reveal to us, is until the end consubstantial with
language.Not being able to say itself while it says other things,
that is, its being always ecstatically in the place of the other, is
the unmistakable signature and, at the same time, the original
taint of human language.31
28 Hamacher, ‘Position Exposed’, p. 259.
29 Agamben, ‘TheThing Itself ’, p. 33.
30 Agamben,What Is Philosophy?, pp. 9–10.
31 Ibid., p. 10.
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The event of language constitutes an archē anypothetos by virtue of the
weakness of language, that is, by virtue of the impossibility of making
thetic by means of language while, at the same time, making language
itself thetic. The aim of this essay has been to argue that the weakness
of language, its presuppositional economy and the ex-position or trace
that inscribes this economy are coextensive and indissociable fromone
another.
Firstly, the weakness of language entails a presuppositional eco-
nomy.Everypositing, by virtueof its verybeing aweakpositing, cannot
beposited insofar as it is positing—it thereforepoints to a presupposed
that must have posited it: a presupposed that can be itself weakly pos-
ited, thus pointing to a new presupposition.
Secondly, the presuppositional economy has always been ex-
posed to the inscription of the trace. The dialectics of positing and
presupposing takes place only by virtue of the écart that separates the
posited from the presupposed before the latter has been posited and a
full difference has been constituted between the two— an écart that is
in fact a self-spacing of positing itself.
Thirdly, the trace or ex-position of positing entails that positing is
always weak positing. Positing, as ex-posed positing, is always inhab-
ited by a self-spacing that distances positing and the presupposed that
must have posited it. This self-spacing of positing precludes positing
from positing itself — it makes positing weak.
There is therefore no presupposition or condition of possibility to
the economyof presupposition (by anhypotheticity), but rather only a
quasi-presupposition, a condition of possibility that, according to the
logic of the quasi-transcendental, is, at the same time, a moment of
impossibility in the economy that it itself makes possible. Positing is
weak positing and positing is ex-posed positing. Or, to repeat Hama-
cher’s words: ‘Positing is exposed positing; abandoned by itself, it is
thus ex-position.’ It is then quite clear that the task can be neither that
of finding a prior presupposed to either version of anhypotheticity
nor that of uncovering the hidden ground of the trace. The very quest
for what the trace has secretly presupposed or pre-excluded is then
irrevocably bound to fail from the start: the logic of presupposition
itself is inscribed by the ex-position of the trace and there can be no
presupposed to an archē anypothetos.
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V
Is this then the whole story? Once again, as for Hegel, Heidegger,
Derrida, and Agamben, the limits of a certain history and of a certain
experience of language have been traced, a new end has been marked:
the end of the history of philosophy, of the history of being, of the
history of presence, of the history of a certain experience of language.
And yet, every time a closure is declared, the very performance of
this gesture seems to backreact on the closure itself, and to propel
its movement one step forward: to a certain extent, the history of
philosophy has not ended with Hegel only because Hegel has marked
its end. Is it then possible that the destruction and deconstruction
of presence might have not left presence unaffected — that the ex-
position of positing might have not left positing itself present in the
sameway?Saidotherwise, is there apotential for the systemofSetzung-
Aussetzung-Voraussetzung to affect itself, or to be affected — but, of
necessity, neither in the simple mode of an auto-affection nor in that
of a hetero-affection?
The positing of all intentionality, be that linguistic, technical, or
phenomenological, operates according to a certain notion of account-
ability of the medium or contribution that gives rise to the order of
presence of positing. As soon as intentionality posits a certain order
of presence, the accountability of the contribution that gives rise to
this positing points to the presupposed of this order of presence: a
presupposed that corresponds to the subtraction of the contribution
of the linguistic, technological, or phenomenological mediation, and
thus reaches a non-linguistic, external, in-itself presence.The first two
paragraphs of the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit present
this notion of accountability for what concerns the mediation that
we are to have with the Absolute, taking as model either the active
reshaping operated by an instrument on a thing (‘it is obvious that
the use of an instrument [Werkzeug] on a thing [Sache] certainly does
not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out to reshape and
alter it’)32 or the passive transmission operated by light (‘a more or
less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then
32 G.W. F. Hegel,Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977), §73, p. 46. See alsoLevinas’s discussion of these two technolo-
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again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists
through and in this medium’).33 This conception of the medium that
affords intentionality or positing — once again language, the hand,
light— is the target of the destruction anddeconstruction of presence,
of the constant presence (beständige Anwesenheit) that underlies even
the restlessness of Spirit. Most certainly, one should hasten to point
out that Hegel proceeds to argue that this conception of the instru-
mentality of cognition is completely inadequate to think the Absolute,
that we cannot learn how to swim before venturing into the water,
and so forth: we must rather presuppose the Absolute and cognition
not to be separated and in need of external mediation to begin with.
It is nevertheless the case that Hegel, in order to set off the logic of
presupposition, considers only the accountable mediation between
two present ‘things’ — even in the case of the Absolute itself: ‘If we
subtract froma reshaped thingwhat the instrument has done to it, then
the thing [Ding]— here the Absolute— becomes for us exactly what
it was before this consequently superfluous effort.’34
This notion of mediation comes to lose its status of accountability
once philosophy — or perhaps, as Agamben would have it, ‘centuries
of humble analysis and grammatical education’ — firmly establishes
the lack of any hierarchically prior element that would be able to struc-
ture and complete the differential chain of mediations: there is neither
a ‘transcendental (or, rather, transcendent) signified’ that would af-
ford a linguistic value to every signifier nor a first being that would
afford an ‘ontological’ value to all beings. The mediation or contri-
bution that brings about presence is then revealed as being neither
accountable nor, let alone, transparent or diaphanous. The import of
the medium that brings about presence cannot be determined by any
meta-element, it can be neither accounted for nor be disregarded: the
contribution of the medium that pro-duces presence is, crucially, a
priori unaccountable. Unaccountable means that presence is brought
about or pro-duced through a contribution that is neither null nor ac-
countable, but rather one that is to remain structurally undetermined
gical/opticmetaphors in Emmanuel Levinas,Otherwise than Being, or, Beyond Essence,
trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1981), p. 17.
33 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, §73, p. 46.
34 Ibid., §73, pp. 46–47; translation modified.
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— for to account for it one would need to resort to an additional
unaccountable mediation.The contributions of language, of the hand,
of light, in bringing about presence cannot be determined: there is no
distillation procedure through which the contribution could be isol-
ated and subtracted from presence in order to restore, or at least infer,
a self-presence anterior to the contributionof themedium. In theorder
of unaccountable presence, it becomes impossible to separate what is
medium, and what is substance; what is for-us, and what is in-itself;
what is described, and what is constituted. Crucially, the unaccount-
ability of the medium precludes the subtraction of the contribution
that has brought about the order of presence — a subtraction that
would otherwise point towards the presupposed as to a non-linguistic
and self-present hypostasis. There is no substratum that is changed by
a relation, but only a relation that bars the substratum.
If on the one hand the contribution of the medium cannot be
subtracted to infer a prior order of self-presence that would precede
the mediated presence, it is nevertheless the case that positing, in
taking place, still points to the site of its emergence, to the site of a
presupposition. But since it is not an order of presence that can be pre-
supposed, since a presupposed presence is actually barred by positing
itself, theminimal determination that canbe taken toprecede theorder
of unaccountable presence is then one of potentiality: a tendency or
liability for events of presence to arise through unaccountable contri-
butions.This potentiality is in no way a determination of a substratum
or an attribute of a self-present substance, but rather a possibility for
determinations and attributes to come to presence. This order of po-
tentiality, then, quite clearly neither ‘is’ nor ‘is not’: it is presupposed
by the order of unaccountable presence only to the extent that the
‘sub’ of this pre-sub-position cannot be said to participate in the self-
presence of a substratum, hypostasis or hypokeimenon. On the other
hand, the order of unaccountable presence can be said ‘to be’ only to
the extent that themark ‘is’ now comes to signal a presence that cannot
be disjoined from the medium that has produced it. The shift at stake
is not simply one between two modes of saying or gathering the ex-
istent: from a saying according to a notion of substance and attributes
(kata ta skēmata tēs katēgorias) to a saying according to potentiality
and actuality (kata dynamin / kata energeian), as dictated by Aristotle.
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It is rather a shift in the horizon of presence that underlies as much
dynamis as energeia, as ousia, as metabolē, as kinēsis, and so forth —
a shift that displaces each and every of these concepts. Metaphysical
presence, constant presence, is in turn promised by the order of po-
tentiality and barred by the order of a shifted actuality, but, as such, it
is never attained.
Crucially, the shift from constant to unaccountable presence
breaks neither with the weakness of language nor with the economy
of presupposition and ex-position of the trace: the order of presence
of the posited and of the presupposed is changed by the inscription
of the trace while respecting the generalized economy of positing, pre-
supposing, and ex-posure. Positing takes place in a different order of
presence, but as weak and self-spaced positing, it still points to a ‘pre-
supposed’ — a presupposed that is not reached by the subtraction of
an accountable contribution, but one that, by virtue of the very im-
possibility of this subtraction, cannot be said to enjoy an autonomous
self-presence: as such, the order of the presupposed is not that of a
self-present substratum, but that of a potentiality for unaccountable
presence to take place. In turn, then, the economy affords the pos-
iting of this presupposed: a positing that itself can only take place
through a new unaccountable contribution and by pointing to a new
prior potential presupposed. At each step, the trace of a difference
distances the unaccountable positing from its unaccountably potential
presupposed.The trace that distances unaccountable presence from its
potential presupposed is neither the same nor different from the trace
that distances constant presence from itself. It can only be said that
the trace respects the presuppositional economy and the principles of
anhypotheticity. Weak and unaccountable language — language that
in positing cannot beposited and language that entails no transcendent
signified or metalanguage — still respects the economy of presup-
position, anhypotheticity, and trace. There can be no more originary
principle that would account for a change or a weathering of presence
and of the trace: the economy of presence and trace has the potential
of affecting itself by means of a hetero-affection.
*
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After having gone through all the figures of presence, it is presence
itself, the order of the posited and of the presupposed — the order
of metaphysics — that comes to be shifted. The image in the mirror,
the reflected image, is still the same— present. As a present image, it
still points to a presupposed of which it is but a reflection. And yet,
the destruction and deconstruction of this order of presence have ex-
posed the un-reflectable condition of possibility of reflection itself: the
tain of the mirror, the opaque foil that covers the back of the mirror,
which, according toDerrida andGasché, inmaking reflection possible,
cannot itself be reflected. The opaqueness of the tain precludes the
closure of all chains of reflection: there can be no close system of self-
present substances and reflected images—the tain cannotbe reflected.
If the system of values of presence and light cannot be determined,
then the import, the contribution of light cannot be determined— as
Levinaswrites: ‘A light is needed to see the light.’35 It is then impossible
to separate, in the presence of the image, what is the reflected and
what is the reflector, what is the result and what is the medium. The
contribution of light does not precipitate at the bottom of the image,
it cannot be removed to infer the presence of that which is reflected.
‘Before’ the reflection there is not something waiting to be altered by
light: this retroactive positing is replaced by that of a potentiality that
can be actualized through different unaccountable contributions. And
yet, the contribution of light is neither null nor infinite, light is neither
transparent nor opaque. In turning to see where the light comes from,
in positing thepresupposition through another light, a newunaccount-
able presence appears, and with it a new presupposition is assumed.
Theeconomyof reflection, the economyof positing and presupposing,
is at the same time preserved and transformed. Constant presence
and unaccountable presence cannot be distinguished: the image in
the mirror is still the same, but one can no longer think of it as an
image of any substance.The non-linguistic, the non-technological, the
non-phenomenological are still shadows and presuppositions of lan-
guage, of the hand, of experience — but there is no non-linguistic,
non-technological or non-phenomenological substance, only possi-
35 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. by Alphonso
Lingis (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1979), p. 192.
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bilities for different languages, different hands, different experiences.
The order of presence of the signifier, of the concept, of conscious-
ness are transformed and yet they preserve the economy of positing
and presupposing. Presentation and representation can be claimed
to persist only if presence itself cannot be accounted for: Hamacher
himself puts forward ‘the possibility of thinking about understand-
ing no longer as an archi-eschatological self-appropriation, no longer
as a making-present, as a presentation or appresentation, but as an
always singular alteration and thus an alteration of the very concept
of understanding.’36 In the unaccountability of the present, truth as
unconcealment (alētheia) and truth as correspondence (adaequatio)
correspond to one another: adaequatio of alētheia and adaequatio.
Equivalently, adaequatio is unconcealed: alētheia of adaequatio.37
Whether presence has the potential to change again, whether its
unaccountability can change and persist at the same time, how the
trace is to weather through it all— the contribution of the question to
thinking is neither that of an instrument on a thing nor that of the light
for the eye; the contribution of the question to thinking is rather the
incitement or soliciting of the potential of thinking to produce further
unaccountable questions.
Exposed and abandoned language, lacking a final word, only
comes forth in unaccountable presence.
Exposed and abandoned philosophy, lacking an abiding stand-
point, only takes place through unaccountable contributions.
Exposed and abandoned weather, lacking an unweathered origin,
only takes place through unaccountable weatherings.
36 Hamacher, ‘Premises’, p. 35.
37 Contrast the alētheia of adaequatio and the adaequatio of alētheia and adaequatio of
the order of unaccountable presence with the trace between alētheia and adaequa-
tio/homoiōsis in the order of constant presence. See e.g. Jacques Derrida, Dissemin-
ation, trans. by Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 192.
It is perhaps to be remarked that Derrida will have remained silent throughout this
essay. But then again, the question at stake has been that of the impossibility for the
trace to render justice to itself, a question addressedmost evidently not in order to find
the what or the who that could render justice to the trace, but with the aim of halting
that very search.
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